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TORTS-TEXAS' HOUSE BILL FOUR'S
NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS IMPOSE
THE BURDEN OF SUPPORTING THE
MEDICAL INDUSTRY SOLELY
UPON THOSE MOST SEVERELY INJURED
AND THEREFORE MOST IN NEED
OF COMPENSATION
Ashley Stewart
N the name of "Tort Reform," Texas' 78th Legislature passed limita-
tions on the amount of noneconomic damages that an injured plain-
tiff can recover in a medical malpractice claim. These damage caps
should be found unconstitutional because they eliminate a deserving
plaintiff's right to have a jury assess noneconomic damages, and they
deny both an open court and equal protection to a severely injured plain-
tiff who is most in need of compensation. Even if the caps are constitu-
tional, they have little connection to reducing frivolous claims or medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums, yet their effect precludes the
most critically injured victims from receiving full compensation for their
injuries.
Section 74.301 of Texas House Bill Four amends the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas as it applies to the liability of
doctors and other health care providers.' The text of section 74.301 states
the following:
(A) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against a physician or health care provider other than a
health care institution, the limit of civil liability for noneconomic
damages of the physician or health care provider other than a health
care institution, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicari-
ous liability theories may apply, shall be limited to an amount not to
exceed $250,000 for each claimant, regardless of the number of de-
fendant physicians or health care providers other than a health care
institution against whom the claim is asserted or the number of sepa-
rate causes of action on which the claim is based.
1. House Comm. on Civil Practices Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003),
available at www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
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(B) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against a single health care institution, the limit of civil
liability for noneconomic damages inclusive of all persons and enti-
ties for which vicarious liability theories may apply, shall be limited
to an amount not to exceed $250,000 for each claimant.
(C) In an action on a health care liability claim where final judgment
is rendered against more than one health care institution, the limit of
civil liability for noneconomic damages for each health care institu-
tion, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability
theories may apply, shall be limited to an amount not to exceed
$250,000 for each claimant and the limit of civil liability for
noneconomic damages for all health care institutions, inclusive of all
persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may apply,
shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $500,000 for each
claimant.2
The caps apply to noneconomic damages, which include past and future
physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and suffering, consortium,
disfigurement, and any other nonpecuniary damages intended to compen-
sate plaintiffs for the suffering they have experienced. 3 The Bill effec-
tively limits a plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages to only
$250,000, no matter how many health care professionals were negligent.
Additionally, a plaintiff can only recover $250,000 in noneconomic dam-
ages if a health care institution was negligent, but this sum is inclusive of
any award of damages resulting from the negligence of health care pro-
fessionals for which the hospital is vicariously liable. Only when there is
more than one health care institution liable can a plaintiff recover more
than $250,000 in noneconomic damages, and even then that award can
not exceed $500,000.4
Proponents of the limitations claim that physicians are facing large in-
creases in their medical malpractice insurance costs because of the in-
creases in the size of damage awards in medical malpractice suits. 5 They
believe that the solution is a cap of $250,000 per claimant, per case on
noneconomic damages, which would in turn lower medical malpractice
insurance rates.6 Some Texas physicians have limited their practices, re-
tired early, or left the state due to the high cost of malpractice insurance. 7
Limits on noneconomic damages are the foundation of reformer's efforts
to reduce medical malpractice rates because they assert that high verdicts
in malpractice cases make it more expensive for insurers to cover poli-
cies. 8 Supporters say "[c]apping non-economic damages at reasonable
2. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
3. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. 1988).
4. See Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (§ 74.301).
5. House Research Org., Focus Report of Constitutional Amendments Proposed for
Sept. 2003 Ballot, H.R. 78-10, R.S., (Tex. 2003), available at www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/
focus/amend78.pdf.
6. Id. at 33.





limits would encourage insurers to do business in Texas by ensuring that
they would not incur massive losses because of large damage awards. As
more insurers joined the market, competition would reduce premiums." 9
Based on California's experience with reduced insurance rates as a result
of damages caps, supporters say that a $250,000 cap on non-economic
damages in Texas would result in a substantial reduction in liability pre-
miums over a period of years.' 0
State supreme courts have struck down more than seventy tort reform
laws on state constitutional grounds." Caps on noneconomic damages
have been held unconstitutional because such statutes violate the funda-
mental right to trial by jury.' 2 The right to trial by jury includes the right
to have the jury determine all factual issues, including the assessment of
damages to which a plaintiff may be entitled.' 3 One court noted that a
"jury is consigned under the constitution the ultimate power to weigh the
evidence and determine the facts-the amount of damages in a particular
case is an ultimate fact."' 14 These states have determined that an auto-
matic damage cap is unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes
on the right to a jury trial by preventing the jury from awarding compen-
sation exceeding the statutory limit.' 5
Limitations on noneconomic damages also violate the open courts pro-
vision in state constitutions because such limits infringe on a plaintiff's
guaranteed right to obtain full redress for injuries caused by another's
wrongful conduct. 16 Courts including the Texas Supreme Court have
held that a limit on noneconomic damages violated a victim's constitu-
9. House Research Org., Focus Report of Constitutional Amendments Proposed for
Sept. 2003 Ballot, H.R. 78-10, R.S. (Tex. 2003), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
hrofr/focus/amend78.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Victor E. Schwartz & Barry M. Parsons, Judicial Nullification of Legislative Action
Continues, 16 No. 10 PROD. LiAB. L. & STRATEGY 4 (1998).
12. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1989) (holding statute which
limited noneconomic damages unconstitutional since the statute violated the right to trial
by jury); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a
$400,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violated a plaintiff's
right to a jury trial); Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 893-94 (Ala. 1993)
(holding that a provision of the Alabama Tort Reform Act limiting awards of punitive
damages to $250,000 violated the guarantee of trial by jury) overruled by, Ex parte
Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward,
715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio 1999) (holding statute which established limits on punitive
damages in tort actions to the lesser of $100,000 or three times the amount of compensa-
tory damages awarded, violated the right to trial by jury); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coali-
tion v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 263-64 (Kan. 1988) (holding statutes setting caps on recoverable
damages for medical malpractice actions are unconstitutional based upon an infringement
of the jury trial right). But cf. Samsel v. Wheller Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan.
1990) (determining that damage cap for pain and suffering did not alter the right to jury
trial or deprive an injured party of a right to a jury to determine and award economic
damages), overruled by Bair v. peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
13. Miller v. Wikel Mfg. Co., 545 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ohio 1989).
14. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 716-17.
15. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 164.
16. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988) (holding statutory cap on
medical malpractice damages for the purpose of reducing malpractice premium rates was
unconstitutional as it violated the open courts doctrine, which guarantees meaningful ac-
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tional right to access to the courts. 17 Many courts have also held that it
was a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection for a
statute to limit noneconomic damages recoverable in a medical malprac-
tice action.' 8 One court reasoned that by "balancing the direct and pal-
pable burden placed upon catastrophically injured victims of medical
malpractice against the indirect and speculative benefit that may be con-
ferred on society," such statutes violate the equal protection provision
found in most state constitutions. 19 Statutes that cap noneconomic dam-
ages do not provide equal protection to "those who are most severely
maltreated and, thus, most deserving of relief. Unlike the less severely
injured, who receive full and just compensation, the catastrophically in-
jured victim of medical malpractice is denied any expectation of compen-
sation beyond the statutory limit."'20
House Bill Four, section 74.301 should be found unconstitutional on
the grounds that it violates a plaintiff's right to trial by jury, right to an
open court, and right to equal protection.2' The Texas Supreme Court
has already held that a similar cap violated the open courts provision in
the Texas Constitution.2 2 Supporters of the cap believe that Proposition
12, which was narrowly passed by the Texas voters, will prevent the su-
preme court from finding that this cap is unconstitutional.23 Besides that,
they claim that "a cap on noneconomic damages would not limit a pa-
tient's right to redress [because] [ilt would not limit the amount a patient
could be compensated for actual losses and damages."' 24 However,
a tort victim "gains" nothing from the jury's award for economic loss,
since that money merely replaces that which he has actually lost. It
is only the award above the out-of-pocket loss that is available to
compensate in some way for the pain, suffering, physical impairment
or disfigurement that the victim must endure until death.25
cess to courts); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1987) (holding $450,000
limit on noneconomic damages violated the open courts provision).
17. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 687, 690; Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1087-89.
18. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836-38 (N.H. 1980) (holding that a statute impos-
ing a $250,000 limit on the amount of noneconomic damages a medical malpractice plain-
tiff could recover violated the equal protection guarantee); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978) (holding $300,000 ceiling violated equal protection clause); Moore,
592 So. 2d at 170 (holding $400,000 limitation on damages for noneconomic loss in medical
malpractice cases violated principle of equal protection).
19. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 170.
20. Id. at 169.
21. See TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 13, 15.
22. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 687 (Tex. 1988).
23. Lucas, 757 S.W.3d at 687. (Proposition 12, passed September 13, 2003, adds sec. 66
to Art. 3 of the Texas Constitution, authorizing the Legislature to set limits on damages,
except economic damages) (House Research Org., Focus Report of Constitutional Amend-
ments Proposed for Sept. 2003 Ballot, H.R. 78-10, R.S. (Tex. 2003), available at http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/focus/amend78.pdf).
24. House Comm. on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003),
available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
25. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980).
[Vol. 57
Casenote
A jury is the proper mode for assessing these types of damages, and any
imposed maximum on these damages violates the constitutional right to
trial by jury. Additionally, supporters of the limit claim that "the cap
proposed by Article 10 of [House Bill Four] would not violate the Open
Courts Doctrine because the limit on damages would be in exchange for
access to health care."' 26 However, "[t]he trade of damage caps for en-
hanced access to health care is insufficient to withstand a constitutional
challenge because there is no guarantee that reducing access to courts in
this way would increase access to health care."' 27 Moreover, any cap vio-
lates the equal protection clause by placing an arbitrary value on human
life, which diminishes the value of the lives of women, children, the eld-
erly, and the disabled. This bill equates a person's life with the amount of
money they earn, which clearly discriminates against individuals whose
value exceeds their income. 28
Should the Texas Supreme Court uphold the constitutionality of these
damage caps, they should still be repealed because arbitrary damage caps
are not the answer to the claimed medical malpractice insurance "crisis."
While the correlation between damage caps and the reduction of health
care costs is, at best, indirect and remote, by contrast, the burden im-
posed by the caps on the rights of individuals to receive compensation for
serious injuries is direct and concrete. 29 Statistics show that there is little
or no connection between high insurance premiums and medical malprac-
tice claims.30 A study conducted by the United States General Account-
ing Office found that "[d]espite the fact that statutory reform, including
damage caps, had been in place for nearly 10 years in some states,... in
the period 'from 1983 to 1985, total medical malpractice insurance costs
for physicians and hospitals rose from $2.5 billion to $4.7 billion." 31 Sta-
tistics from the Texas Board of Medical Examiners show that the number
of malpractice cases and the size of claim payments in Texas have de-
creased, even as liability premiums doubled or tripled.32 Weiss Ratings,
Inc., which rates the safety of financial institutions including insurance
carriers, found that malpractice premiums increased faster in states with
caps than in states without them.33 It found that "[i]n 19 states that im-
plemented caps during [a] 12-year period, physicians suffered a 48.2 per-
cent jump in median premiums .... However, surprisingly, in 32 states
without caps, the pace of increase was actually somewhat slower, as pre-




29. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 168-69 (Ala. 1991).
30. See id. at 167-68.
31. Id. at 167 (emphasis added) (quoting General Accounting Office, Medical Mal-
practice: Insurance Cost Increased but Varied Among Physicians and Hospitals, HRD-86-
112, at 2 (Sept. 1986).
32. Terry Maxon, Studies on Medical-Malpractice Caps Offer Conflicting Results in




miums rose by only 35.9 percent. ' 34 Government data also found that in
2000, malpractice insurance premiums constituted only 0.56 percent of all
health care expenditures. 35
Furthermore, limiting noneconomic damages to only $250,000 will not
lower malpractice insurance nor reduce frivolous claims because such
claims are not affected by a cap whose limit is higher than the damages
they will likely receive. Several state supreme courts invalidating caps on
equal protection grounds have found
that the necessary relationship between the legislative goal of rate
reduction and the means chosen to attain that goal is weak for two
reasons: "First, paid-out damage awards constitute only a small part
of total insurance premium costs. Second, and of primary impor-
tance, few individuals suffer noneconomic damages in excess of
$250,000.1"36
Limitations on damages do "nothing toward the elimination of nonmeri-
torious claims. Restrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to ...
remain in practice, but do so only at the expense of claimants with meri-
torious claims."' 37 According to the federal government's National Practi-
tioner Data Bank, the median payment for a settlement in 2000 was only
$125,000, and the median payment for a judgment was only $235,000.38
Other government data found that the mean medical malpractice payout
in 2002 was only $271,995. 39 Frivolous claims could be reduced, not by
damage caps that are set higher than the amount a plaintiff is likely to
recover anyway, but by a "loser pay" system.40 This would ensure that
only legitimate, meritorious claims are brought because a plaintiff who
loses would have to pay the legal fees and court costs of the winning
defendant.
The answer to "tort reform" lies not in arbitrary damage caps, but in
regulation of the insurance industry and the doctors who are actually
committing the malpractice. There is no guarantee that limiting the
amount of noneconomic damages an injured plaintiff can receive will
lower malpractice insurance rates. If House Bill Four is to stand, insurers
should promise that these caps will result in lower premiums. The Bill
should require that any reductions in tort costs be applied directly to re-
34. Weiss Ratings, Inc., Medical Malpractice Caps: The Impact of Damage Caps on
Physician Premiums, available at www.citizen.org/print-article.cfm?ID=10038 (June 2,
2003).
35. Public Citizen, New 2002 Government Data Dispute Malpractice Lawsuit "Crisis",
at www.citizen.org/documents/NPDB-Data.pdf (July 7, 2003).
36. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary
Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 169 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Jenkins, California's Medical Injury Com-
pensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 951 (1979)).
37. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978).
38. Public Citizen, Medical Malpractice Award Trends: Believe Government Sources,
Not Doctors, at www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/medmal/articles.cfm?ID=8798 (Jan. 14,
2003).
39. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 35.




ducing premium rates.41 Additionally, insurance companies should only
raise premiums for doctors who have actually been found negligent and
have incurred a claim against their policies. Only one in eight preventa-
ble medical errors committed in hospitals actually results in a malpractice
claim.42 According to government data, only 15.9 percent of all doctors
paid on a malpractice claim during the period of 1990-2002. 43 Further-
more, only 5.2 percent of doctors paid on two or more malpractice claims,
yet these doctors were responsible for 55 percent of all payouts.4 4 This
data shows that it is only a small percentage of doctors are responsible for
medical malpractice. The burden of reducing malpractice insurance
should fall on their shoulders and not on the 84.1 percent of doctors who
are doing their job correctly. Reform could also be achieved by repri-
manding the doctors who commit malpractice. Surprisingly, only 10.7
percent of all doctors who incurred three or more malpractice payouts
have been disciplined, and only 16.9 percent of those doctors who in-
curred five or more malpractice payouts have been disciplined. 45 Ac-
cording to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, the board
received more than 6000 malpractice complaints against doctors between
January 2001 and May 2002, yet opened no investigations during that pe-
riod.46 If negligent doctors are more closely monitored, the number of
medical malpractice injuries will drop, thereby reducing the number of
claims actually brought against doctors.
Section 74.301 of House Bill Four should be found unconstitutional be-
cause it strips a deserving plaintiff of constitutionally guaranteed rights to
trial by jury, to an open court, and to equal protection. Even if such a cap
is constitutional, arbitrary limitations on noneconomic damages are not
the answer to tort reform because they do little to reduce malpractice
insurance rates, yet cause harm by preventing the most deserving victims
from gaining compensation for their injuries. The most catastrophically
injured victims should not be forced to support the medical industry, the
very entity which caused their injuries. The answer to lower premiums
lies in regulating the insurance companies and negligent doctors.
41. Id.
42. Public Citizen, Quick Facts on Medical Malpractice Issues-Frequency of Medical
Malpractice Claims, at www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/medmal/articles.cfm?ID=9125
(Mar. 4, 2003).
43. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 35.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. House Comm. on Civil Practices, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003),
available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
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